Some wonderfull events in my life Essay Example for Free

Some wonderfull events in my life Essay Everybody in the world is pass from different and various events during his/her lives. I also observed and pass through the many events from my childhood up to present now. As I grow up I perceives knowledge form the education, nature, etc. He enjoys events or occasion, makes friends, etc. Friends are very important in ones life because friends are responsible to give shapes of ones life. I got a chance to live in a good life in a big city when my dad transferred to a city. I did my kinder garden in a small village of just 2000 population of people. Mostly villages are not as developed as large cities. I was like a poor village boy at that time, but as my dad got job in city it also proved helpful to me because I got a chance to live like a modern boy. Therefore this event of getting job led me to live in a good life. When I was in Middle school, I had a lot of friends in my school and near by my area too, as I was very successful in making a bad friends rather than good friends. In other words I learned those activities, which parents want to keep away from their kids. I learned to smoke, started drinking alcohol, harassing girls and started all those activities that were illegal at that time of my age. I did not study for my school and was failing in my subjects. However, I got rid of those bad friends as soon as I could, otherwise I do not think that I can be a good educated person in the society with the company of those friends. Actually after entering in to a new community, I made very good contacts with very bad people. Therefore, this event of making friends proved to be unsuccessful or bad for me. My last event is love event, which I encountered when I was in High school that proves to be very important and helpful in my life until now. I liked one girl in my school. She was my girlfriend for two long years. Those two years are considered among the best years of life. She is two years younger than me, but she was an A student and I was a B student. She is intelligent and always helped me in my study matter. She encouraged me to get good grades in exam. She became very happy if I get good grades and we always had a party after each exam in any subjects. Only because of her help I reached up to college otherwise if she did not meet me in High school, IÂ  could not even graduate from my High school. Everybody says that to have a girlfriend during college education is not a good thing, because if we have a girlfriend, we also need to spend time on them that cause an adverse effect on education especially if anybody is in professional school. However, according to me, it is depends on a how a girlfriend is. If she understands the importance of education and life, she helps a boy in achieving success. I am doing BS in Biochemistry and will going to transfer in Spring 2005. I can say that she was behind me to push me up to college, and even in future I need her to get my degree because she is the one who always encouraged me to do well. Therefore, this love event in my life proves to be very successful, and helpful in my life.

Shoplifting: A Hard Habit to Break Essay example -- Dialogue Essays

Shoplifting: A Hard Habit to Break Erik* walks up to me outside of the Diesel store on Newbury Street. â€Å"I needed new jeans,† he said. A little further away from the store he shows me the pants that cost about $150 in he store, he shoplifted or as he says "scooped" two pairs. Inside the bag with the pants are a few shirts and the shoes he is wearing he tells me he switched with shoes he had on. Erik is 22, he does it because he says he is feeding an addiction. His name has been changed for anonymity. â€Å"No drugs, I don’t drink, I’m in shape, but every day if I come home after work without something I have to go back out and get it,† he said. â€Å"I take things because I can’t stop,† he says. â€Å"A lot of it I end up giving away because I move a lot and I don’t need it.† Erik has lived in Boston, Washington, California, Georgia, and Florida in the last year. He’s either touring with bands or just traveling. â€Å"Right now I have a shopping list for over $300 in Banana Republic,† said Erik. â€Å"I get stuff for other people and they give me half of what it costs, I really don’t even need a real job.† According to the National Retail Security Survey and reported on retailindustry.com â€Å"total inventory shrinkage cost U.S. retailers $32.3 billion last year, up from $29 billion the year before.† $10 billion of this was attributed to shoplifting. â€Å"Most of my friends shoplift or at least they have in the past,† said Erik. â€Å"Some people ‘work for eBay’, they steal expensive things that are really random from a lot of stores. Like my friend Matt takes these boxes of drawing pens that are worth either $60 or $200 and sold them on eBay. Almost every state he’s lived in has made the transition of having them out in normal art stores to underneath Ple... ...op when she wants to. Erik has not been caught, but he knows the consequences of shoplifting. â€Å"You can go to jail for a long time if they want to put you away that bad, it’s also a federal offense so every time I’d apply for a job I’d have to say what I did.† Erik already has many misdemeanor charges in various states due to fighting. â€Å"I want to stop [shoplifting] but I can’t, most people don’t though, want to stop.† Although Jason Lane said most of the thefts are found out later on surveillance cameras retailindustry.com quotes Hayes, president of Loss Prevention Specialists, as saying that â€Å"technology is critical to maintaining low loss levels.† In their article he said, â€Å"Because shoplifters are largely targeting small, highly desirable merchandise, these retailers have increasingly turned to electronic article surveillance devices to protect their merchandise.†

How Does Equity Fulfil the Common Law

How Does Equity Fulfill the Common Law Common Law Equity fulfils the common law, although it does not endeavour to displace it with a moral code. In order to be influential, the law is to be professed as both certain and predictable, and also flexible and fair. Specifically, it needs clear rules on the one hand, but flexibility on the other to produce exceptions to cases that lead to apparently incongruous or unjust conclusions if the rules are applied rigidly. Equity is an essence of principles, doctrines, and rules advanced initially by the Court of Chancery in positive competition with the rules, doctrines and principles of the Common Law Courts. The obliteration of the old Court of Chancery and the Common Law Courts, has led to the proposition that the distinction between law and equity is now outdated; that the two approaches are now ‘fused. On the contrary, the better analysis, is that the common law and equity remain distinct but mutually dependent features of law: ‘they are working in different ways towards the same ends, and it is therefore as wrong to assert the independence of one from the other as it is to assert that there is no difference between them. ’ For a long time, the two structures of common law and equity ran uncomfortably side by side. Until 1615 it was by no means established which one was to prevail in the event of a dispute. Yet, even after that year the inconsistency between the two systems continued for a very long time. After the restructuring of the English court system in 1865, it was decided that in the event of a conflict between the common law and equitable principles, equity must prevail. The Judicature Acts 1873-1975 created one system of courts by amalgamating the common law courts and the courts of equity to form the Supreme Court of Judicature which would administer common law and equity. Accordingly the court ‘is now not a Court of Law or a Court of Equity, it is a Court of Complete Jurisdiction. ’ The area of law recognized as Equity developed in England and Wales in the Middle Ages in situations where the ordinary common law had failed to afford suitable redress. Many legal actions, for example, originated by the issue of a writ but the slightest inaccuracy on the writ would invalidate the entire action. Another inadequacy in the ordinary common law involved the fact that the only remedy was damages; that is, compensation, therefore, the court orders did not exist to require people to do something or to desist from some conduct, for example, sell as piece of land according to an agreement made or stop using a particular title. Dissatisfied litigants frequently preferred to petition the King for him to mediate in a specific case, the courts were, in any case, the King’s courts. These petitions’ for justice were dealt with by the King’s Chancellor who determined each case according to his own discretion. Over the years, the decisions made by Lord Chancellor became known as the rules of equity, derived from the Latin meaning levelling. These new-found rules came to be applied in a special court, the Chancellor’s Court, which became identified as the Court of Chancery. Equity began to appear as an apparent set of principles, rather than a personal jurisdiction of the Chancellor, during the Chancellorship of Lord Nottingham in 1673. By the end of Lord Eldon’s Chancellorship in 1827 equity was recognized as a precise jurisdiction. Nevertheless the development of a parallel but distinct system of dispute resolution was certainly bound to generate a conflict. An individual wronged by a failure of the common law to remedy a gross injustice would apply to the court of equity. The Chancellor, if the case accepted it, would approve of a remedy preventing the common law court from imposing its order. The catharsis transpired in the Earl of Oxford’s Case, where the court of common law ordered the payment of a debt. The debt had previously been paid, but the deed giving affect to the requirement had not been cancelled. The court of equity was prepared to grant an order preventing this and resolving the deed. The collision was in due course resolved in favour of equity; where there is an inconsistency, equity prevails. This rule is now preserved in the Supreme Court Act 1981, s 49. The history of equity is regarded by its constant ebb and flow between compatibility and competition with the common law. More recent developments in equity include, for example, the recognition of restrictive covenants, the expansion of remedies, the development of doctrines such as proprietary estoppel, the enhanced status of contractual licences, and the new model constructive trust. There is an effort, then again, to validate these new developments, which are all illustrations of judicial inspiration, by precedent. As Bagnall J said in Cowcher vCowcher: ‘this does not mean that equity is past childbearing; simply that its progeny must be legitimate- by precedent out of principle. It is well that this should be so; otherwise no lawyer could safely advise on his client’s title and every quarrel would lead to a law-suit. ’ In all probability the single most significant feature of equity is the trust. If title to any property is vested in a person as trustee for another, equity not only restrains the trustee from denying his trust and setting himself up as absolute owner, but impresses on the trustee positive duties of good faith towards the other person. Although one of the original development of equity, the protection granted to equitable owners behind a trust has developed considerably over the last 50 years. Remedies represent some interesting illustrations of the difference between law and equity; a difference which arose as; ‘an accident of history,’ according to Lord Nicholls in A-G v Blake. Ordinarily legal rights and remedies remain separate from equitable ones. Some similarities do, nevertheless, occur. For illustration, an injunction, an equitable remedy, can be sought for an anticipatory breach of contract, or to stop a nuisance, both common law claims. In A-G v Blake, the House of Lords authorized the equitable remedy of account of profits for an assertion for violation of contract where the common law remedy of damages would have been insufficient. The equitable remedy of account of profits is usually accessible where there is a fiduciary relationship but the House of Lords endorsed its request otherwise in exceptional cases where it was the operative way to remedy a wrong. By distinction, in Seager v Copydex, proceedings were brought for breach of confidence in regard for confidential information exposed by the defendants about a carpet grip. Such a claim is equitable and normally the equitable remedies of injunction and account are obtainable. On the other hand, an injunction would have been unsuccessful and he judges awarded damages. It would appear, consequently that a common law remedy is available for an equitable claim for breach of confidence. The new model constructive trust resulted in the main due to the resourceful activity of Lord Denning MR. In Hussey v Palmer, Lord Denning explained the constructive trust as one ‘imposed by the law wherever justice and good conscience require it. Cases such as Eves v Eves, where the woman was awarded an equitable interest in the property signifying her involvement in terms of heavy work, and Cooke v Head, a comparable case, regard this progress further. On the other hand, it might be that this progression has come to a standstill since the retirement of Lord Denning. A number of modern cases, including Lloyds Bank v Rosset, have re-established former ideology in this s phere relating to the survival of a common intention that an equitable interest should occur, and the existence of a direct financial contribution. These ethics are more analogous to those relating to the formation of a resulting trust. The new model constructive trust has been for the most part thriving in the field of licences. At common law, a contractual licence was controlled by the doctrine of privity of contract, and failed to present protection against a third party. Equitable remedies have been made accessible to avoid a licensor violating a contractual licence and to permit a licence to bind third parties. It has been acknowledged that certain licences may produce an equitable proprietary interest by means of a constructive trust or proprietary estoppel. In Binions v Evans, it was decided by Lord Denning that purchasers were compelled by a contractual licence between the former owners and Mrs Evans, an occupant. A constructive trust was imposed in her preference as the purchasers had bought specifically subject to Mrs Evans’ interest and had, for those grounds, paid a reduced price. Also in RE Sharpe, a constructive trust was imposed on a trustee in bankruptcy regarding an interest obtained by an aunt who lent money to her nephew for a house purchase on the arrangement that she could live there for the rest of her life. The volatility of these progressing fields is once more shown in recent case law which seems to hold back from an advancement which may have pushed the boundaries too far. Obiter dicta from the Court of Appeal in Ashburn Anstalt v W JArnold & Co, accepted in Habermann v Koehler, propose that a licence will only give effect to a constructive trust where the conscience of a third party is influenced: it will be imposed where their behaviour so deserves. Judicial resourcefulness in equitable disciplines is therefore made subject to refinements by judges in later cases. Proprietary estoppel is an additional illustration of an equitable doctrine which has seen momentous progression in the interest in justice ever since its formation in the leading case of Dillwyn v Llewelyn. The dogma is established on encouragement and acquiescence whereby equity was equipped to arbitrate and adjust the rights of the parties. Its relevance has been further improved by the Court of Appeal in Gillet vHolt, where a wider line of attack to the doctrine was taken that depended, eventually, on the unconscionability of the act. Once more, it is an advancement which is outside of the organization of property rights and their registration recognized by Parliament. Cases such as Jennings v Rice show that the principle of proprietary estoppel and the protection of licences by estoppel continue to be a successful means used by the judges for the protection of licences and equitable rights. The extent to which the right welcomes protection is adaptable owing to the conditions of the particular case. For example, in Matharu v Matharu, the licence did not bestow a beneficial interest but presented to the respondent a right to live in the house for the rest of her life. A different prevailing progression in equity has resulted from the decision of the House of Lords in Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien. The case has proclaimed the re-emergence in a broad sense of the equitable doctrine of notice. They present that, where there is undue influence over a co-mortgagor or surety, this may provide augmentation to a right to prevent the transaction. This right to avoid the transaction amounts to an equity of which the mortgagee may be considered to have constructive notice. This revivification of the equitable doctrine of notice in a contemporary situation reveals evidently the flexibility of equity. A number of cases pursued this pronouncement. In Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge, the House of Lords laid down common procedures for the application of the doctrine of notice in this situation. In summary equity fulfils the common law, although it does not endeavour to displace it with a moral code. There have been setbacks and refinements, over the last 50 years, in the progress of new doctrines relating to the trust.

What is intelligence within psychology Is it innate or culture - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 9 Words: 2680 Downloads: 3 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Psychology Essay Type Analytical essay Did you like this example? The concept of intelligence and understanding the mechanisms that create, sustain and develop it have both captivated and bemused scholars for millennia. For sure, as self-reflexive beings we are destined to comprehend or delineate the question of knowledge; the retention of information à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å" the immaterial that has a pivotal function in not only creating the psycho-social world but allowing it to evolve. The purpose of this essay is to examine the definitional nightmare that has plagued our conception of what intelligence is or how it should be described, before exploring the contributions made by psychology in capturing and measuring this phenomena. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "What is intelligence within psychology? Is it innate or culture?" essay for you Create order In turn, this essay will explore one of psychologys longstanding dichotomous dilemmas, the nature vs. nurture debate, to explore whether intelligence is an inherent virtue or something ascertained through interaction and culture.   This essay is one of exploration, a discovery and piecing-together of various strands within psychology, to provide an account of what intelligence is and its place of origin. It seems somewhat obvious that our academic ancestors would have been heavily persuaded by the supernatural and otherworldly, before the emergence of scientific discourse and so-called Enlightenment. For Plato (2014), the soul existed independently of the corporeal, imbued with beauty, elegance and knowledge par excellence, residing in the sacred realms of perfect forms and facts before marrying with the body; a metaphorical prison that hindered the souls quest for actualisation. Thus, intelligence was a process of realisation or recollection, the overcoming of a fickle, po lluted, and decaying body to a higher state of becoming; a master artisan of reflexivity or philosopher king (Plato 2014, 88). However, philosophers like Aristotle (2013) often regarded as the father of psychology -  Ãƒâ€šÃ‚   whilst sustaining the Cartesian Dualism somewhat, contended that there was a marriage (hylomorphic) between the mind and body; the former (passive intellect)   an infinite and immortal vessel that engages with the former (active intellect) and its five senses to assimilate and project into (inter)action. However intellect (nous) remains an abstruse and spiritualised entity. As Magee (2000) alludes, such philosophical interpretations have an artistic and somewhat godly quality pertaining to intelligence, its origin and ascertainment. The advent of pseudosciences like phrenology sought to locate intellect within the details of the human skull; dimples and dents where regarded as proof that human potential could be determined, thereby damming alrea dy marginalised groups and heightening the divide across race, class and the sexes (Uttal 2003). The succession of science, whilst discounting religion as an illogical and epistemologically restrictive domain, also had a disenchanting effect (Weber1946) on our understanding of intelligence; placing it within realms of quantification, a variant that could be detailed, standardised, examined and subsequently explained without the need for wonder and mystic. Accordingly, psychology became a prime protagonist in exhuming the mythical and establishing the measurable substance of intelligence, its elemental makeup and related descriptions. So, what is intelligence? Ironically, this topic remains hotly contested within psychology, though most accept that intellect is a necessary component for adaptation. It requires a host of mental operations (including a malleable brain), physical capabilities and ecological cues to converge à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å" to some extent à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å" in an o rchestrated manner, allowing one to synthesise successfully, advance and ultimately master the environment around them. As the American Psychological Association suggest, it is the global capacity to profit from experience (APA 2015). The work of Piaget (1972) has assisted immensely in our understanding of (child) development and the cognitive-intellectual building blocks or schemas that emerge from birth, his preoccupation with how knowledge grows led to several assertions. In principle, intelligence is the creation of these mental representations through a process of assimilation i.e. the generation and deployment of schemas to manage (new) situations and/or objects, and accommodation which can be likened to schematic adjustments or transformations as new (updated) information is confronted. For Piaget (2001), intelligence is a process of four unique stages of increasing complexity, beginning with the sensorimotor stage at birth where the infant relies heavily on its motor senses to engage with the world, and ending with formal operations stage where the child develops abstract thought, employs deductive reasoning and differentiates oneself from others à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å" progressing from primitive to infinitely complex structures, concepts and codings. Similarly, for Cattell (1963) intelligence may be dissected into two dialectical concepts: the broad function to think logically and problem-solve through unfamiliar processes called fluid intelligence (Gf) and the ability to reason and implement based on previously acquired knowledge or what he called crystallised intelligence (Gc). However these original conceptions have been subsequently expanded to include a whole host of mental abilities (Lubinski 2004), including memory, visual and auditory processing. Yet, interaction with the world demands what Salovey and Mayer (1990) call emotional intelligence whereby, as social creatures, humans can appropriately gauge and control their own emotive state wh ilst determining that of others what Weber (1946) calls verstehen to act with purposeful and productive intent both individually and collectively; this requires social learning and a mastery over ones emotive impulses à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å" where biological impulse and society meet, the latter defusing, moulding and directing the former (Lieberman 2013). Indeed, as an extreme example, we discover in psychopaths the inability to form emotional bonds or act empathically, tending to mimic emotive demonstrations (Raine and Glenn 2014), leading to dysfunctional and extremely harmful individuals. Ironically, typical traits of psychopaths include a high level of general intelligence which is understood as the capacity to assimilate, comprehend and apply facts, laws and principles. Indeed, in his psychometric investigations, Spearman (1927) introduced the term general factor (g) to denote that humans possessed à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å" to varying degrees à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å" a core construct of cognit ive capacity or mental energy. This was assessed by tapping into what he called specific factors (e.g. arithmetic, logic, and written) using a variety of mental tests; his findings showed that those participants demonstrating high performance on specific mental tasks tended to achieve in others.   In addition, arguing the case for multiple intelligences, Thorndike (1920) posits an additional social intelligence, which parallels with our capacity as sentient animals, that includes our aptitude for participating and profiting within the social milieu; to act wisely, assimilate norms and values and interact with others. These techniques and interactive strategies are learned through social conditioning and vary across societies (Goleman 2007). Thus, intelligence appears to be multifaceted in its conceptual makeup, often hierarchical and including subdivisions of specificity. For cognitive theorists, there has been a tendency for proponents of the psychometrics to focus purely on the realm of conceptual structure whereas they place impetus on uncovering the process through which intelligence is gained; a computer analogy is often deployed to describe how information is processed through various senses, mental nodes and serial formations. Importantly, as Jensen (1987) postulates, mental processing speed may play a pivotal role in intelligence, as well as how effectively we collate, compartmentalise and articulate mental representations of information. Theorists consider the basic components or models of cognition, such as creativity, attention, thinking and perception, and how these function. A variety of computer-like models have been generated as a kind of heuristic device or ideal-type (Huneman 2007) to detail mental procedures. For example, Atkinson and Shiffrin (cited in Ashcraft and Raduansky 2013) outline a multi-stage model of memory that shows various phases through which information is collated, stored and retrieved in a kind of processor-like i nput-storage-retrieval procedure; a variety of systems, including attention, sensory memory and the rehearsal loop, are involved in deciphering, coding, storing and retrieving memories. A variety of research conducted on brain-function has provided some concrete evidence for cognitive theories inasmuch as the brain might be divided into sectors of functionality; the temporal lobes are involved in speech, memory and behaviour whereas the frontal lobe has been considered responsible for behaviour, movement and intelligence (Smith and Kosslyn 2008). Indeed, whilst certain regions of the brain can be attributed with particular tasks, most researchers accept the interconnectedness nature involved in creating intelligence.   As Eysenck and Keane (2010) suggest, in order to measure cognitive phenomena and attempt to illuminate the genealogy of intelligence, researchers employ a host of mental tests, including the original Binet-Simon (later Stanford) intelligent quotient (IQ) or iginally devised to identify underperforming children à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å" which assesses general components of intellect, to more specific skill-related tests that account for memory, verbal, speed and emotional aptitude. In some cases, such tests have a high level of reliability, validity and standardisation providing a reasonable indicator (correlation) of aptitude and achievement potential. However, such tests have come under considerable criticism, particularly because of their class, race and cultural biases (Greenfield 1997); what should define intelligence and how this should be measured/assessed remains a problematic issue for all testing. Also, appreciating that the mind is a malleable organ and suited to adaptation based on environmental demands, it seems logical that humans will evolve differently across cultures; measures, values and descriptions of intellect will vary accordingly (Nisbett 2009). Similarly, aspects of intellect will be heightened according to environment, for example, in hunter-gatherer societies, spatial awareness and attention may be regarded as more useful tools (and may be accentuated in such cultures) than maths or verbal abilities (Smith and Kosslyn 2008). Sadly, despite the implementation of scientific measurement, the psychology of intelligence remains somewhat speculative, hypothetical and dependant on mental constructs. The biological approach to intelligence seeks to place intellect within the realm of hard facts as a means of explaining (rather than describing) behaviour. However, this reductionist view is considered complementary to cognitive models and computer analogies of intelligence (Claxton 2015). Indeed, many studies, using modern technologies like Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET), have sought to pinpoint activity within the brain when performing specific tasks as a method of compartmentalising brain function and sources of intelligence. Similarly, there has been consider able research into brainwaves and the effect on task performance and blood-flow as an indicator of mental activity (Devlin and Fienberg 1997). The field of DNA has also revealed the contribution that genes make to intelligence (using various IQ test), especially in adulthood with the implication that we reinforce (or indeed resist) our genes as we develop. Also, investigation into twin studies à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å" particularly identical or dizygotic pairs à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å" has demonstrated a strong correlation (between 70-80% variance) between heritability and intelligence; identical pairs separated at birth show similar readings in intellect whilst adopted children show similarities to that of their birthparents (McCartney et al 1990). Moreover, our understanding of genetic disorders, such as dyslexia and neural diseases like Alzheimers and Downs Syndrome further illuminate the biological grounding of intelligence and its related brain functions (Slade 2009). Malyby and Day (2013 ) has also proposed how cultural influence interacts with the biological. For example, (mal)nutrition, stress and mental scars due to trauma can impede on intelligence; this pertains to various environmental factors, such as poverty, war and abuse. In fact, as a retort to the biological approach, is the consideration of culture in shaping intelligence. As Skinner (2011, 46) one expounded give me a child and Ill shape him into anything alluding to the notion that the mind is a tabula rasa awaiting social imbuement. Yet, as Berg (2012) recounts, the (social) world is an asymmetrical field, where resources or architectural means to reach ones potential are stockpiled in the hands of a few; denoting that social inequality remains an important factor in pedagogic (indeed human) potential, conditioning across race, class and gender boundaries generates specific malignant societal formations that hinder progress. In addition, as Fox et al (2011) demonstrates, those who come from dysfunctio nal families, where domestic violence is present, or placed in foster care show lower IQ scores than non-institutionalised cohorts of similar attribute or those who are subsequently removed from such environments; these tend to perform better in testing once removed. A classic example of the impact environment has on not only intellect but psychosocial development is that of feral children; these individuals lack a host of higher-intellectual faculties, including human language, empathy and social behaviours (Ashcraft and Radvansky 2003). This illuminates the importance of culture in, at the least, coaxing and facilitating human potentials. In this essay we have explored the various conceptions and descriptions offered by psychologists and their philosophical ancestors to measure and explain intelligence. In truth, this appears to a definitional nightmare, filled with conjecture or hypothetical formations, though strenuous efforts are made using scientific measures to access the still illusive question of what intelligence is, a phenomena that has a multitude of variants across a range of societal and cultural spectrums. Yet, psychology has certainly offered an account of what may constitute intelligence, unlike our philosophical ancestors, science has permitted academics to fish through the lens of objectivism to uncover the composition of intelligence and its origin. Indeed, on the issue of nature versus nurture, it is apparent that both are interdependent; biology and genetic factors are certainly prerequisites for development and adaptation but both shaped by and dependant on environmental and social influences. Similarly, on a cellular or neural level, researchers observe the interrelations between various regions of the brain and, whilst on a conceptual level we find that a range of cognitive processes are involved in our intellectual makeup. That said, to what extent remains a mystery; the psychology of intelligence continues to be a best guess, but arguably a respectable one that is under constant scientific revision. References American Psychological Association. 2015. Topic in intelligence found at:   https://www.apa.org/topics/intelligence/. 28th September 2015. Aristotle.2013.Reprint. The Works of Aristotle: The Famous Philosopher. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform Ashcraft, M. Radvansky, G. 2013. Cognition. Pearson Education. Berg, G. 2012. Low-Income Students and the Perpetuation of Inequality: Higher Education in America. Ashgate Press: UK. Carroll, J. 1993.Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor-analytical studies. Cambridge University Press: NY. Cattell, R. 1963. Theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence: A critical experiment. Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol 54(1), pp 1-22. Claxton, G. 2015. Intelligence in the Flesh: Why Your Mind Needs Your Body Much More Than it Thinks. Yale University Press. Devlin, B. Fienberg, S.1997. Intelligence, Genes, and Success: Scientists Respond to The Bell Curve. Copernicus Press. Eysenck, M. Keane, M. 2010. Cognitive Psychology: A Students Handbook. 6th Edition. Psychology Press: London. Fox, N.Almas, A.Degnan, K.Nelson, C. Zeanah, C. 2011. The Effects of Severe Psychosocial Deprivation and Foster Care Intervention on Cognitive Development at 8 Years of Age: Findings from the Bucharest Early Intervention Project. J Child Psychol Psychiatry. Vol 52(9), pp. 919à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å"928. Glenn, A. Raine, S. 2014. Psychopathy: An Introduction to Biological Findings and Their Implications. NYU Press. Goleman, D. 2007. Social Intelligence: The New Science of Human Relationships. Arrow Publishers. Greenfield, P. 1997. YOU CANT TAKE IT WITH YOU: Why Ability Assessments Dont Cross Cultures. American Psychologist. Vol. 52(10), pp. 1115-1124. Huneman, P. 2007. Understanding Purpose: Kant and the Philosophy of Biology. University of Rochester Press. Jensen, A. 1987. Process differences and individual differences in some cognitive tasks. Intelligence. Vol 11(2), pp107-136. Lieberm an, M. 2013. Social: Why our brains are wired to connect. Oxford University Press. Lubinski, D. 2004. Introduction to the Special Section on Cognitive Abilities: 100 Years After Spearmans (1904) General Intelligence, Objectively Determined and Measured. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 86(1), pp. 96-111. Magee, B. 2000. 2nd edition. The Great Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy. Oxford University Press, U.S.A. Maltby, J. Day, L. 2013. Personality, Individual Differences and Intelligence. 3rd Edition. Pearson Press. McCartney, K. Harris, M. Bernieri, F. 1990. Growing up and growing apart: A developmental meta-analysis of twin studies. Psychological Bulletin, Vol 107(2), pp. 226-237. Nisbett, R. 2009. Intelligence and How to Get it: Why Schools and Cultures Count. W. W. Norton Company. Piaget, J. 2001. The Psychology of Intelligence. Routledge Piaget, J. 1972. Psychology of the Child. Basic Books. Plato. 2014. The Republic. Rep rint. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. Salovey, P. Mayer, J. 1990. Emotional Intelligence. Imagination, Cognition and Personality. Vol 9 (4), pp. 185-211. Skinner, B. 2011. About Behaviourism. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Slade, M. 2009. Personal Recovery and Mental Illness: A Guide for Mental Health Professionals. Cambridge University Press. Smith, E. Kosslyn, S. 2008. Cognitive Psychology: Mind and Brain. 1ST Edition. Pearson Press. Spearman, C. 1927. The Abilities of Man. American Psychological Association. Vol 67(9), pp56-105. Thorndike, E. 1920. Intelligence Examinations for College Entrance. The Journal of Educational Research. Vol 1(5), pp329-337. Uttal, B. 2003. The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain. MIT Press. Weber, M. 1946. From Max Weber: Essay in sociology (Ed Gerth, H. Mills, C). Oxford University Press: Oxford.